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Funm:s IN.rmr.es-rs-Rssl'.RAINTS ON ALmNATION-8.AM:E ROI.Es APPLIR:ssT.RAINTs ON Fu'l'1lllB AND PossEsSORY lN.rmr.esTs-Testator devised

CABLE TO

real estate to his wife for life, remainder to his children, "with the following
understanding," that should any child attempt to dispose of his interest before
the death of the testator's wife, that child would forfeit his share and it would
go to the remaining children. After the death of the testator, but before the
death of his widow, one son conveyed away his interest in the property. In
a suit for the partition of the real estate devised by the testator; held, on appeal,
restraints on the alienation of vested estates in fee simple are against public
policy and are therefore void. The conveyance by the son was effective.
Andrews v. Hall, 156 Neb. 817, 58 N.W. (2d) 201 (1953).
Throughout most of its history our legal system has looked with disfavor
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upon restraints on the alienation of vested legal interests in real property.1 One
of the soundest reasons for the rejection of such restraints today is that they
conBict with the social and economic policy directed toward making possible
the £ullest economic utilization of land.2 ~estraints are of two basic types,3
disabling restraints4 and forfeiture restraints.r; An absolute and unqualified
restraint of either type is void when imposed upon an otherwise absolute legal
interest.6 By the great weight of authority, disabling restraints qualified as to
time on a fee are also void,7 and forfeiture restraints qualified as to time on a
fee are generally void.8 A small though indefinite number of states,9 the
most notable among them being Kentucky,10 have departed from the general
rule by holding that forfeiture restraints limited in time on a fee are valid if
they are "reasonable." Nebraska has been in this latter group for some time,
and the principal case is significant in that it explicitly repudiates the position
previously taken by the Nebraska Supreme Court11 and places Nebraska in
the group of states folio-wing the more general rule. Furthermore, the restraint
in the principal case was on a future interest, a vested remainder in fee, and
this raises the seldom litigated question of whether rules applying to restraints
l On the general subject see Schnebly, "Restraints Upon the Alienation of Legal
Interests," 44 YAU L.J. 961, 1186, 1380 (1935), a slightly altered, e."!)anded and more
current version of which is found in 6 .fu.mmCAN LAw OF PROPERTY, part 26 (1952); 2
Smms, Fannm hmilu!STs, c. 29 (1936); 4 PROPERTY RESTA'l'l!l\mNT, part II (1944).
See also Fratcher, ''Restraints on Alienation of Legal Interests in Michigan Property," 50
1\,hcH. L. REv. 675, 793, 1017 (1952).
2 2 Sn,ms, Fannm hmmEsTs §§442, 444 (1936).
3 A third type of restraint, the promissory restraint, is not discussed in this note. See
4 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT §404, comment g (1944).
4 Such a restraint withholds from the conveyee the power to make a transfer, voluntary
or involuntary, and any attempted transfer is void. The term "disabling" seems to have
originated in Schnebly, "Restraints Upon the Alienation of Legal Interests," 44 YAI.B L.J.
961 at 963 (1935). Disabling restraints are gener,illy less favored than forfeiture restraints.
4 PROPERTY RESTATEl\mNT §405, comment a (1944).
G Such a restraint either e.'Ctinguishes the interest of the conveyee on his transfer in
violation of the restraint, his interest then going either to the creator of the restraint or to
a third person, or else makes his interest subject to destruction at the will of the creator of
the restraint or his heirs.
6 Many cases are collected in 6 &mmcAN LAw oF PROPERTY §26.15 (1952). Accord,
4 PROPERTY RESTATEl\mNT §§405, 406 (1944). A well-recognized exception to this rule
is a restraint on alienation by a trustee. 6 .fu.mRICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §26.13 (1952).
7 See the cases collected in 6 &mmCAN LAw OF PRol'ERTY §§26.16 to 26.17 (1952),
and 2 Smms, Fonnm hmilu!s:rs §451 (1936).
8 See the cases collected in 6 &mmcAN LAw OF PROPERTY §§26.19 to 26.21 (1952),
and 2 Smms, Fannm !NrEREsTs §457 (1936). Accord, 4 PROPERTY RESTATEl\mNT
§406, comment e (1944).
9 See Fleming v. Blount, 202 Ark. 507, 151 S.W. (2d) 88 (1941); Matlock v. Lock,
38 Ind. App. 281, 73 N.E. 171 (1905); Hinshaw v. Wright, 124 Kan. 792, 262 P. 601
(1928); Furst v. Lacher, 149 Minn. 53, 182 N.W. 720 (1921); Lynch v. Lynch, 161 S.C.
170, 159 S.E. 26 (1931).
10 See the cases collected in 6 .fu.mRICAN LAw OF PROPERTY §26.22 (1952), and 2
Smms, Fonnm !NrERESTs §458 (1936).
11 See Peters v. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co., 119 Neb. 161, 227 N.W. 917
(1929), declaring valid a disabling restraint operative for ten years on a fee. It is this case
that the principal case ei..-pressly overruled. But cf. Moffitt v. Williams, 116 Neb. 785,
219 N.W. 138 (1928).
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on the alienation of possessory interests are applicable equally to restraints on
future interests.12 The few decided cases suggest that the same rules will
he applied to a restraint on a future interest as would he applied if the restraint
were on a fee in possession. This is true whether the restraint may continue
in effect after the future interest has come into actual possession,13 or whether
the restraint may in terms continue operative only so long as the future interest
remains non-possessory.14 It may he argued that instead of the usual flat
prohibition of restraints qualified as to time on the voluntary alienation16 of
otherwise absolute legal interests in land, it would be desirable to adopt a
qualitative approach toward these restraints.16 Such an appro11ch might weigh
the length of time during which alienation is restrained, the purpose for which
the· restraint is imposed,17 and the practical effect that the restraint has on
alienation18 against the public interest in promoting the free alienation of
land.19
Chester F. Relyea, S.Ed.
12 Since the policy of the law even now does not favor the alienation of contingent
future interests to the extent that it does in the case of vested interests, it seems possible
that courts might permit e."l)ress rest:Iaints on the alienation of contingent future interests
for the period prior to vesting even in those jurisdictions where alienation is permitted. See
Sweet, "Rest:Iaints on Alienation," 33 L.Q. R:sv. 236 at 245 (1917); Gordon v. Tate,
314 Mo. 508, 284 S.W. 497 (1926); Minter v. People's National Bank, 95 Ind. App. 204,
182 N.E. 87 (1932).
13 See Mandlebaum v. McDonell, 29 Mich. 78 (1874); Hause v. O'Leary, 136 Minn.
126, 161 N.W. 392 (1917); Johnson v. Gaines, 230 N.C. 653, 55 S.E. (2d) 191 (1949);
McFadden v. McFadden, 302 Ill. 504, 135 N.E. 31 (1922); Wright v. Jenks, 124 Kan.
604, 261 P. 840 (1927). Accord, 4 PROPERTY Rl::STAT.l!MENT §411 (1944). "No authority has been found which has divided the rest:Iaint and upheld it for the period of time
during which the future interest. may remain non-possessory." 6 fumRICAN LAw OP
PROPERTY 492 (1952).
14Voellinger v. Kirchner, 314 Ill. 398, 145 N.E. 638 (1924); Lathrop v. Merrill, 207
Mass. 6, 92 N.E. 1019 (1910); Watkins v. Minor, 214 Mich. 380, 183 N.W. 186 (1921).
But cf. In re Goulder, [1905] 2 Ch. 100; Barker's Estate, 159 Pa. 518 at 526, 28 A. 365
(1894). The Restatement is in accord ,vith this proposition where the future interest is
indefeasibly vested, but e.'\.'l)ressly takes no position where a forfeiture restraint is to endure
only so long as the future interest restrained remains contingent or defeasible. 4 PnoPERTir
fuSTAT.l!MENT §411, caveat and comment e (1944).
15 It should be noted that a restraint upon the involuntary alienation of property
leaves the property free from the claims of creditors, a situation which would appear to be
intolerable.
16 The gains from such an approach probably would accrue primarily to those who,
through lack of competent legal advice, attempted to accomplish their purpose by the use .
of a restraint on alienation rather than by the use of an acceptable device, such as a trust.
17These cases suggest some legitimate purposes: In re Congested Districts Bd., [1919]
1 Ir. R. 146 (upholding restraint affording security to vendor for payments due); Earls
v. McAlpine, 27 Grant Ch. 161 (1879), app. dismissed 6 Ont. Rep. 145 (1881) (upholding rest:Iaint enforcing support for widow); Northwest Real Estate Co. v. Serio, 156 Md.
229, 144 A. 245 (1929) (rejecting restraint facilitating urban development). See Sweet,
''Rest:Iaints on Alienation," 33 L.Q. Ri::v. 236 at 246 (1917).
18 The very act of creating a future interest usually imposes a strong economic rest:Iaint
on the alienation of either the future or the possessory interest. This has been used as an
argument for permitting forfeiture restraints on present legal life estates. See 6 &mmCAN
LAw OP PROPERTY §26.48 (1952).
19 See 6 A?.mmcAN I.Aw OP PRoPERn §§26.25 to 26.30 (1952).

